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Anarchism and business ethics: the social 
responsibility of the anarchist is to destroy 
business∗ 
Benjamin Franks 
abstract 
‘Anarcho’-capitalism has for decades occupied a small but significant position within 
‘business ethics’, while the anarchism associated with the larger traditions of workers and 
social movements has only had a spectral presence. Social anarchisms’ forms of 
opposition and proposed alternatives to standard liberal business practices, identities and 
presuppositions have appeared only fleetingly in mainstream business ethics. In the light 
of these anarchist hauntings, this paper identifies and explores social anarchism’s 
critique of dominant forms of business ethics, and business practice. It applies 
anarchism’s critical insights to market-based ethics, of which Milton Friedman’s 
influential essay, ‘The Social Responsibility of the Businessman is to Increase Profits,’ is 
used as an exemplar. This paper differentiates the anarchist critique from the criticisms 
of corporocentric, economic-liberalism emanating from social democrats and advocates 
of corporate social responsibility. It demonstrates the pertinence of social anarchist 
approaches to re-thinking the co-ordination of the production and distribution of goods, 
highlighting inadequacies in state-centred managerial responses to the harms and 
deficiencies of Friedman’s free-market. 
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Introduction 
Milton Friedman, the influential Chicago School scholar and Nobel prize winner, 
wrote ‘The Social Responsibility of Business is to Increase its Profits’ (henceforth 
‘The Social Responsibility’), an essay which has become a highly influential text 
within contemporary business ethics. Friedman’s work holds a ‘determinate 
position of prestige; organizing and mobilizing so many theoretical and practical 
conceptions of what might be the responsibilities of business’ (Jones, 2007: 512). 
Even theorists of corporate social responsibility, citing Friedman, prioritise 
profitability and legality over the ‘ethical and philanthropic’ (see A. B. Carroll’s, 
Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility, reprinted in Schwartz and Carroll, 
2003: 204). Friedman’s essay was published originally in The New York Times in 
September 19701 and has been reproduced in many different locations and cited 
(according to Google Scholar) nearly 8000 times 2 . Despite the many 
commentaries on this text, and the rise of the academic specialism of business 
ethics in general, explicit anarchist engagement with the discipline and text has 
largely been absent. This omission is particularly surprising, given that, as 
critical management theorists such as Stephen Dunne (2007) point out, there is 
much to be gained from radical engagement with managerialist writings. 
Similarly, business ethicists are largely ignorant of, or silent on, anarchism. The 
major texts on business ethics have few references to anarchism: for instance, 
there are no references to it in Andrew Crane and Dirk Matten’s Business Ethics 
(2010) or R. Frederick, ed., A Companion to Business Ethics (2002). A keyword 
search finds it is absent from journals such as Business Ethics: European Review, 
Business Ethics Quarterly and Business & Professional Ethics. On rare occasions 
when business ethicists use the terms ‘anarchist’, it is often as a modification of 
Nozickian propertarianism, which is anathema to the anti-hierarchical, anti-
capitalist principles of actual anarchist groups (see, for instance, the papers in 
Machan and Long, 2008). This is not to say that anarchism is entirely absent, but 
that its presence is spectral, it haunts texts as an unacknowledged force for 
benevolent social change and virtuous collective practice, and as a potential threat 
to the ideological presumptions theories, practices and ambitions of business 
advocates and theorists.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The version used here is from Corporate Ethics and Corporate Governance (Springer, 
2007). 
2  Google Scholar lists over 7800 citations as of 14 March 2014, 
<http://scholar.google.co.uk/scholar?q=Milton+Friedman+%22The+social+responsi
bility%22&hl=en&as_sdt=0%2C5 > (approximately 3 .5 citations a week since it has 
been published). 
Benjamin Franks Anarchism and business ethics 
article | 701 
The notion of haunting is borrowed from Jacques Derrida’s Spectres of Marx 
(2006)3. Derrida’s contemporary non-Marxist Marxism (ibid.: 62) echoes many 
of the longstanding themes of the libertarian socialist tradition (Jun, 2011). 
Anarchism disrupts and alarms current practices, with possibilities of alternative 
futures. It points to suppressed past and present contradictions (Derrida, 2006: 
xix-xx, 1-2). In response dominant powers reshape the spectre into a position they 
can understand (ibid.: 5, 8-11). As Jon Simons (2000) in his account of 
hauntology, notes: 
Such spectres remind us that “the time is out of joint”, that there is something 
wrong with the time we live in that is obscured […]. Marx understood that 
capitalism is out of joint because it contains fundamental contradictions which he 
explained, among other things, as class conflict. 
The spectre, which Derrida (2006: 7) distinguishes from mere spirit, is not just 
ideational, but interacts and takes material form, influencing social practices as a 
result. In Karl Marx’s original allusion, it takes a ‘holy alliance to exercise this 
spectre’ (Marx and Engels, 1977: 34). This alliance is made up of state and 
pseudo-state agents, conservative ideologues, reactionary and liberal 
representatives. They were identified in Marx’s day as ‘Pope and Czar, 
Metternich [conservative politician] and Guizot [anti-socialist liberal statesman], 
French Radicals and German police spies’ (ibid.: 34). A contemporary alliance of 
hierarchical institutions and ideologies is similarly armed against the spectre of 
anarchism. 
In the light of these hauntings, this essay’s main argument demonstrates that 
social anarchism has a coherent and compelling critique of dominant business 
ethics and business practice. It applies anarchism’s critical insights to market-
based ethics, of which Friedman’s essay is used as an exemplar. It will show the 
pertinence of sophisticated anarchist approaches to re-think the co-ordination of 
the production and distribution of goods, highlighting inadequacies in state-
centred managerial responses to the free-market. In this regard the argument 
follows an older and much marginalised tradition in business ethics, from 
Aristotle and Marx, that considers business practice to be inherently unethical, as 
opposed to the Enlightenment position, following J. S. Mill and Immanuel Kant 
that views it as a consensual, productive activity, though open to individual 
malfeasance (Frederick, 2002b: xiii-xiv). In order to develop my argument I will 
clarify several key terms – ‘business’, ‘management’ and ‘anarchism’ – basing 
the interpretation of the last of the three terms on historical and existing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
3  Campbell Jones (2007) identifies deconstruction at work in Friedman’s text - drawing 
out the contradictions, silences, slippages and tensions that exist within the text. 
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anarchist movements and texts, rather than the standard academic construction 
of ‘anarchism’. 
Anarchism in outline 
In the same way that a child who is scared of the real threats posed by the adult 
world will conjure up superstitions to explain and provide an aura of control over 
complex social phenomenon, so too academics whose disciplines and 
presuppositions feel threatened by anarchist critiques and practices construct a 
spirit of anarchism disconnected from core anarchist writings and movements 
(for a wider discussion see McLaughlin, 2007: 1-21; Franks, 2012; Jun, 2013). The 
mythic version of anarchism (linked to Nozick’s misnamed ‘libertarianism’) is a 
legend that has been repeated so often that it has become, in some quarters the 
only account of anarchism. It is a dogma reduced to a single criterion: the 
absolute rejection of coercion (see or instance R.P. Wolff, 1970; Nozick, 1974), 
with a corresponding subsidiary axiom of benign essentialism to explain how 
anarchists deal with the possibility of conflict (e.g. J. Wolff, 2006: 76). This 
amounts to little more than a straw man, as few forms of anarchism are based on 
such a thin principle. Lack of coercion, as a sole principle, is inadequate as it 
omits manipulation and structural forms of domination. Benign essentialism is 
also epistemologically and ontologically suspect. In the first place, it is 
epistemologically suspect as there is no reliable way to discover a universal 
human essence, which is made up of so many distinct and fluid drives and 
instincts (Malatesta, 1984: 73-5; Kropotkin, 1992). In the latter case it is 
inconsistent with the anarchist anti-foundationalism (see Malatesta, 1984: 75; 
Sheehan, 2003: 57-79; Jun, 2011: 143-51). Anarchists reject the idea that there are 
god-given or fixed principles, but that stable moral values emerge from the 
interchanges between subjects and their material contexts and social practices. 
By contrast, in this paper, anarchism is based on the stable, pervasive but not 
necessarily universal principles found consistently in the historical and 
contemporary libertarian socialist or class struggle anarchist groups (see Quail, 
1978: x; Franks, 2010: 140-2). The first is a contestation of hierarchical social 
structures, including economic, political and social forms, which demarcates 
anarchism from right-libertarian (propertarian) ideologies as well as statism. 
Capitalism is regarded as being based on and maintaining economic inequalities 
and requiring coercive institutions, of the state (or state-like institutions) to 
enforce ‘voluntary agreements’ (Kropotkin, 2013: 39-52; Chomsky, 2005a). 
Second is a social view of the self. This views individual identity as fluid but 
largely constructed by social institutions and the recognition from – and 
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interaction with – others. As such, it views individuals as interconnected, 
materially grounded and mutually interdependent, rather than abstract and 
independent as in liberalism or Egoism. It reveals itself in slogans such as that 
from the Anarchist Black Cross that ‘no one is free until all are free’ and the 
Industrial Workers’ of the World’s refrain that ‘an injury to one is an injury to 
all.’ 
Third, anarchism privileges prefigurative action, in which the aims are embodied 
in the goals, such that organisations geared towards the contestation of 
hierarchies of gender, race or class, should themselves be anti-hierarchical 
(Guillaume in Bakunin, 1984: 7). This places anarchism outside of 
instrumentalist political traditions like Leninism and social democracy in which 
authoritarian methods are justified if they meet libertarian-egalitarian goals. In 
anarchism, by contrast, actions are not just evaluated in terms of social 
outcomes, but whether they generate immediate shared mutual goods (these are 
compatible with virtues even if they are not always explicitly identified as such) 
(Franks, 2010). It is found, for instance, in the expansive use of virtue-related 
language in anarchist critiques, with its emphasis on values such as bravery, 
compassion and justice (See, for instance, Q. SHAC in SchNEWS, 2009; 
SchNEWS, 2010; SchNEWS, 2011), rather just on protecting possessive rights or 
producing revolutionary outcomes. These principles of anti-hierarchy, a social 
view of the self and prefiguration are consistent features of past and 
contemporary anarchist organisation (see, for instance, Rocker, nd [1938]: 16; 
Solidarity Federation, 2013). 
The fourth feature, found consistently in classical anarchist works such as those 
by Michael Bakunin, Errico Malatesta and Naom Chomsky, is a rejection of a 
universal epistemology. No single branch of knowledge can demarcate universal 
principles for the liberation and operation of all other social practices (Bakunin, 
1970: 34-37; Malatesta, 1984: 151-52; Chomsky, 2005b: 178-9). Thus, as Bakunin 
highlights in his example in support of open authority, it is legitimate to accede 
to the boot-maker when shoes need to be mended, or to an architect when a 
building needs to be designed, as they can openly demonstrate their skills within 
a particular set of practices (stable, but adaptable goods-rich, rule governed social 
activities) (Bakunin, 2010: 32; for an account of a ‘social practice’ see MacIntyre, 
2003). Different practices have different categories of experience, truth 
conditions, discourses and rules, and whilst they frequently intersect, no single 
practice and it is underlying norms takes priority. Thus, it would be illegitimate 
to comply with authority, and that expert to expect compliance, outside of the 
domains for which they can transparently demonstrate (and thereby share) 
ability. 
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Because anarchism operates in, through and against specific practices in 
particular temporal and spatial locations, some principles become more 
significant in some locations that others. For instance anti-statism might become 
more peripheral, where the democratic state’s role is more progressive than the 
domination by capital (Chomsky, 2007). In the critique of business practices, by 
contrast, all of these key principles are highlighted. 
Business and business ethics 
For the purposes of this article, ‘business’ is defined as the activity and/or 
institutional practice of producing and selling goods and services primarily for 
commercial exchange. This is not to ignore that like the vast majority of pertinent 
concepts, ‘business’ is a disputed term. There are important efforts by critical 
management theorists to disentangle ‘business’ from simply commercial 
operation in order to open these activities to reflective analysis and potentially 
transform organisational governance (Alvesson and Willmott, 1992). Some 
enterprises also refer to themselves as ‘not for profit business’, although this 
simply reaffirms that those businesses which are not so prefixed are ‘for profit’. 
Further, even ‘not for profit’ companies can still be operating on the principles of 
maximising returns, but using the surpluses to increase pay for its operators and 
organisational expansion. The limited use of ‘business’ to the more standard 
interpretation based on privileging commercial exchange, is consistent with the 
now dominant account of corporocentric business behaviour.  
In this orthodox account of business, every product or service has a good (a use-
value), but it is realised, under market-principles, only when its exchange-value is 
met. Under capitalism, exchange-values take priority over use-values. In the 
production of commodities the aim is to maximise returns on investment (Marx, 
1885; Cleaver, 1979: 72-5). Businesses produce commodities (material goods or 
immaterial services) which have use values as well as exchange values. It is 
undeniable that the rationale for starting or operating a business is not always, 
solely, the generation of surplus value. For instance, a spouse of a farmer might 
diversify by operating a holiday bed and breakfast facility, which is partly for the 
purpose of overcoming social isolation. The more the enterprise is aimed at 
satisfying shared interpersonal needs and desires (internal goods) rather than 
external economic ones, the less it is operating as a business. So, whilst 
production of use values and exchange values do occasionally coincide, there are 
inevitably points where prioritising income (shorter term, intermittent but more 
profitable lets) comes into conflict with satisfying the social goods of communal 
interaction (longer, sustained bookings). 
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The terms ‘business’ and ‘management’ tend to be used interchangeably by 
some anti-hierarchical activists. Class War (1992: 58), for instance, identifies the 
class enemy as the managing class as they seek to impose business priorities over 
the inter-subjective interests of the workers. The Andersons (1991) also see 
management in terms of one class having a domineering power-relation onto 
others in order to exploit the economically weaker. Although potentially 
erroneous, it is not surprising as there is a general tendency to regard 
management as the development and sustenance of relationships that co-
ordinate business objectives (see, for instance, the definition of ‘management’ 
from the online Businessdictionary.com, 2013). As ‘business’ is defined solely in 
terms of maximising return on investment (in short, medium or longer terms) 
then management, in this sense, is rejected by anarchism. However, regarding 
management solely in terms of a hierarchical, capitalist relationship or forms of 
manufacture that are more oppressive than those under capitalist modes of 
production (slavery, for instance) risks overlooking the production of goods that 
are co-ordinated in a non-hierarchical manner, and these too can be considered a 
form of ‘management’.  
Anarchism promotes, through central notions such as ‘solidarity’ and ‘mutual 
aid’, collegial productive activity (Kropotkin, 1998; Kropotkin, 2013). Productive 
practices that operate under norms distinct from capitalist production (certain 
forms of co-operative, mutual aid, friendly and informal goods generation) also 
need co-ordination and as such, these types of formal and informal organisation 
can be considered to be examples of management. Co-operative production is 
sometimes classified as ‘self-management’, ‘democratic management’ or ‘anti-
hierarchical management ‘. Sometimes ‘self-management’ simply means the 
internalisation of capitalist governance principles (Negation, 1973). Similarly, 
Lopdrup-Hjorth et al. (2011: 97-104) recognise the risk that self-management can 
be a means of self-alienation, but they rightly recognise too that self-management 
need not be reduced to management based on capitalist norms and identities. 
However, many theorists associate ‘management’ primarily with ‘business’, so 
when Burrell (1992: 80) examines carnivalesque co-ordination of communal 
well-being, in contrast to the hierarchical and repressive production of goods, he 
uses concepts like ‘reciprocity’, ‘interdependence’, ‘mutual[ity]’, ‘anti-structure’ 
and ‘communitas’ rather than ‘management’. 
The identification of ‘business’ and ‘management’ with privileging commercial 
exchange can be seen in the dominate discourses of commercial administration. 
Throughout the 1980s and early 90s, as Burrell (1992: 69-70) points out, there 
was a rise of ‘management’ courses within education based on promoting the 
structuring of production on neo-liberal norms. The pervasiveness of the new 
title of ‘manager’ within even junior ranks of an organisation led to those seeking 
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higher esteem within such hierarchies to identify themselves as ‘business 
administrators’, and especially as ‘masters’ in such a discipline.  
Business ethics categorises, identifies and evaluates the principles by which 
commercial practice takes place; it is thus narrower than management or 
organisational ethics, and by necessity privileges market values as core to our 
understanding, even when it critiques them. In this respect Friedman’s essay 
provides an excellent example of business ethics, a kind of corporocentric value-
system based on the flourishing of business institutions, in the same way that 
biocentric ethics seeks to protect the inherent value of all living entities.4 This 
identification of a corporocentric ethic may seem surprising given that some 
interpret Friedman’s essay as a rejection of ethics. The phrase ‘business ethics is 
an oxymoron’ is often used in relation to Friedman and those who follow him 
(see, for instance, Duska, 2000; Shepard, Shepard and Wokutch, 1991) as his 
argument appears to suggest that there is a conflict between economic self-
interest and wider ethical considerations and that the latter is subservient to the 
first (Swanson, 2002). However a sympathetic reading of Friedman’s essay, 
suggests that it does contain a narrow ethic, which limits deeper and more 
sophisticated values. It is not his amorality but his flawed moral position that is 
the basis of the anarchist critique. 
Friedman in outline 
Friedman’s essay, ‘The Social Responsibility’ was published in a largely modern 
liberal newspaper in 1970, three years before the crisis of Keynesianism catalysed 
by the OPEC oil price shock. As a result of its time and audience it makes a 
number of concessions to social democratic tendencies, making a play for their 
commitment as part of the wider and largely successful ideological battle of the 
following decade. Such compromises were unnecessary 10 years later, as the 
intellectual and popular climate turned against Fabian socialism and New Deal 
liberalism (Friedman and Friedman, 1980: 283-90). In ‘The Social 
Responsibility’ Friedman argues that the employee of a corporation (‘a 
businessman’, to use Friedman’s gender-partial language) has two moral 
responsibilities: first, to obey the law and, second, to meet their contractual 
obligations. Whilst, not formally acknowledging an overt moral philosophy, it 
does identify specific norms to guide social behaviour, with reference to wider 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4  ‘Corporocentric’ is preferred to Bevan and Werhane’s (2011: 47) term ‘firm-centric’, 
because although it too places the commercial organisation at the centre, it is 
predicated on them maintaining relationships of diverse stakeholders potentially on 
different criteria than profit. Corporocentric is specific to regarding all such 
relationships with stakeholders as ultimately being based on financial self-interest. 
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justificatory principles, and thus minimally meets the criteria for an ethic. The 
two principles Friedman refers to are consistent with a neo-Kantian ethical code. 
These obligations are absolute and binding, with no other principles or set of 
principles able to challenge their supremacy (Friedman, 2007). Friedman largely 
limits his discussion to corporations, those owned by shareholders, excluding the 
self-employed (‘individual proprietors’) and organisations run for reasons other 
than profit (‘eleemosynary’ institutions such as charitable hospitals) (ibid.: 173). 
Friedman condemns those who promote the notion that employees have wider 
ethical considerations than making profits as ‘unwitting puppets of the 
intellectual forces that have been undermining the basis of a free society these 
past decades’ (ibid.: 173). Although Friedman does not name these intellectual 
forces in this essay, it is likely to be the social paternalists, the dominant and 
increasingly crisis prone ideologists of the dominant class, who are the subject of 
his wrath. They are more overtly identified as such in Free to Choose. The social 
democrats are considered more of a threat than Marx (who is firmly associated, 
in the period of authorship with the unpopular statist Leninist/Maoist tradition) 
and thus poses little intellectual challenge (Friedman and Friedman, 1980: 99-
100 and 284). The left-libertarian currents of the American New Left, that argued 
for forms of inter-dependent, co-operative social practice that avoid or contest 
economic pressures, are absent from Friedman’s essay. Indeed the ultra-left only 
appear as agents of capital, in the figure of the wildcat trade unionists who wish 
to break government imposed wage-restraint (Friedman, 2007: 176). Friedman, 
in his account of the conscientious labour militants who reject government 
interference into market forces, excludes the details that they were frequently 
anti-capitalists, who were willing to break employment contracts because they 
were made under conditions of economic coercion: positions that are rejected by 
Friedman (Friedman and Friedman, 1980: 236-8). 
For Friedman, these dupes who believe in social responsibility are guilty of three 
argumentative flaws: first, they fail to adequately identify ‘social responsibility’, 
making the term so nebulous as to be meaningless; second, they assign 
responsibilities to an entity that has no direct responsibilities. For Friedman, a 
corporation is not a moral agent; it is only individuals that have responsibilities. 
Third, they ascribe to ‘businessmen’ the wrong duty and in doing so bring about 
damaging ends (Friedman, 2007: 173-4). 
The first of Friedman’s criticisms arises from the fluidity of the term ‘social 
responsibility’. Such a term emerges because there are myriad social tensions 
and the term fixes responsibility for these problems on corporate actors. 
Friedman’s initial point is that term is used chaotically. Yet many key terms have 
fluid meanings depending on context; this does not make them meaningless, but 
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does require more careful clarification. Second, Friedman himself provides a 
basic interpretation, which is clarified further by his critics, like Joel Bakan and 
Andrew Crane and Dirk Matten, in which corporate social responsibility (CSR) is 
viewed in terms of non-malfeasance (limiting harm to others) and beneficence 
(doing good for others), even when there is no contractual obligation to do so 
(Crane and Matten, 2010: 48-9, for further discussion of the distinctions within 
CSR and the development of corporate social responsiveness and performance 
see ten Bos and Dunne, 2011). So basic is non-malfeasance to virtuous practice – 
it is, for instance, the cornerstone of benign human interaction and professional 
codes of conduct, dating back to the Hippocratic Oath (‘first do no harm’) – that 
its absence in ‘The Social Responsibility’ becomes the start-point for Bakan’s 
(2004: 57) portrayal of corporations as psychopaths.  
Friedman’s second criticism is that only individuals, not collectives like 
corporations, can have responsibilities. Friedman argues that as the corporation 
is as an aggregate of workers and owners, any obligation must be on either the 
shareholder or the employee. There is little discussion of the obligations of 
shareholders other than that their primary duty is to maximise profits, and that 
any individual failure to do so would make them uncompetitive and lead to 
business failure (Friedman, 2007: 173). To pursue secondary goals at the expense 
of primary duties, which have not been agreed by the shareholders (owners), is a 
violation of a freely entered contract and constitutes theft. Thus it is 
impermissible for an employee to seek to reduce pollution by putting in 
additional, non-statutory environmental safe-guards. For Friedman, such action 
is illegitimate as it takes potential profit from shareholders without their consent 
(Friedman, 2007: 174; cited in Bakan, 2004: 43). This is a categorical violation of 
contract (promise) and of trust. 
The employee by signing a contract has only two duties: to do what the owners 
wish and to obey the law. This basic neo-Kantian (deontological) position is 
defended by Friedman. Individual sovereignty, viewed in terms of negative rights 
(rights of non-interference), is given priority. Autonomous subjects are free to 
make the contracts they wish to make without coercion and without regard to the 
benefit of others, so long as negative rights are not violated. The state is the 
ultimate protector of sovereign rights, so the law has to be respected. So if the 
individual wishes to pursue beneficial social goals – and this is Milton 
Friedman’s sop to the social democratic audience – this can be pursued through 
private political action (Friedman, 2007: 175). Later, though hinted at in this text, 
Friedman is more convinced that free markets alone are best placed to resolve 
social problems, with which state power can only ineffectively interfere 
(Friedman, 2007: 176-7).  
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A corporation is thus restricted from pursuing beneficial goals unless one of two 
conditions is met. The first is that it compelled by government so to do; the 
second, if it is in corporate self-interest. So in the first case a company should 
reduce pollution if the law compels them. Similarly a company might pursue 
socially benevolent goals, if it is likely to increase profit, by enhancing consumer 
loyalty or attracting better job candidates (ibid.: 177). It is this form of CSR that 
Friedman approves of, as it is done intentionally to maximise profits. This appeal 
to enlightened self-interest, that benevolent action will have better economic 
returns in the future, is also one to which his critics turn. 
Although, as will be discussed, Friedman’s critics return to enlightened self-
interest, it should be pointed out at this juncture that Friedman’s justification 
here is principally non-ethical. The first, acting benevolently or non-malevolently 
because of compulsion (fear of government sanction) violates the principle that 
moral behaviour is freely (at least minimally) chosen or willed. The second, the 
appeal to self-interest alone, flouts the principle that ethical action is primarily 
concerned with the treatment of others. Thus Friedman’s position in support of 
enlightened self-interest is primarily anti-ethical. However, his overall stance is 
not wholly amoral: it is instead minimally ethical as it gives a supreme priority to 
Kantian rights, maintaining promises (contracts) to which an autonomous agent 
has freely entered into. It should be noted, too, that discordant with this largely 
rights-based position (which is sceptical of consequentialism) (ibid.: 176), 
Friedman, using Adam Smith’s concept of the invisible hand (ibid.: 176), 
smuggles in some utilitarian considerations, arguing that market economies 
produce best outcomes. 
Also consistent with neo-Kantian ethics, Friedman initially appears critical of 
companies who ’window-dress’: that is, cynically dupe customers by portraying 
themselves as being motivated by socially responsible goals rather than profit. He 
sees such duplicity as undermining the honesty needed for a free-society (ibid.: 
177). However, whilst calling such dishonesty over intentions ‘fraud’, Friedman 
would see no grounds to have sanctions against it (ibid.: 177), unlike more 
standard Kantian jurisprudence (Kant, 1790). Nonetheless, there is an ethical 
disdain for dishonesty, and admiration for brave assertion of unpopular, honest 
self-identity. Friedman’s argument might prioritise the wrong ethical principles, 
but it is not entirely amoral. 
Responses to Friedman 
Friedman’s essay has also generated considerable critical response, though little 
utilising contemporary critics of liberalism from more standard political 
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philosophy5. Instead, amongst the most popular is Bakan’s book and co-authored 
popular documentary The Corporation (Dir: Mark Achbar and Jennifer Abbott, 
2003). Friedman himself appears in the film alongside luminescent critics such 
as Howard Zinn, Noam Chomsky and Naomi Klein, and is positioned as the 
primary advocate of corporate self-interest. One of Bakan’s major criticisms is 
based on Friedman’s claim that corporations have no specific duties other than to 
maximise profit and as such must not do anything that undermines such self-
interest. They have structured their legal framework so that this is now obliged of 
them (Bakan, 2004: 37). Corporate institutions, thus, encourage the development 
of psychopathic personalities. They are the epitome of unvirtuous agencies. 
In Friedman’s account of corporations, they are structured to enhance economic 
self-interest, with only government as an external control (ibid.: 80). However, as 
Bakan identifies, control by government is insufficient. Corporations are 
committed to self-interest and are in competition with other self-interested 
institutions; as a result, corporations have to undertake a cost-benefit analysis as 
to whether they comply with law. The commitment to legality is hypothetical 
rather than categorical. If a corporation obeys costly law, when evasion would 
increase their profitability (taking into account risk of successful prosecution), 
and a competitor act self-interestedly on the same calculation, then the 
competitor gains advantage (ibid.: 79-83). In further competition for resources 
the law-abiding corporation is at an economic disadvantage: compliance with 
regulatory standards is just another factor to be considered in cost-benefit 
analyses.  
With corporations having greater sway over Western governments, it is not a 
surprise that corporate self-governance replaces the regulatory system. The 
regulatory system repeatedly fails ‘because of lax regulation and ineffectual 
enforcement’ (ibid.: 84). These lapses are not accidental but actively encouraged 
by corporate bodies (ibid.: 96-110). 
In response to corporate psychopathy Bakan advocates four main strategies to 
encourage corporations to be socially responsible, that is to consider the interests 
of other entities. These tactics are: 1) improve the regulatory system, 2) 
strengthen political democracy, 3) create a robust public sphere and 4) challenge 
international neo-liberalism (ibid.: 161-7). The first two promote representative-
democratic control of corporations, through the constitutional process, the third 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5  For instance, in the last decade (March 2004-March 2014) in the journals Business 
Ethics Quarterly, Business Society Review and Business Ethics: European Review 
Joel Bakan is cited with significantly greater regulatory than such influential political 
philosophers as Iris Marion Young and Philip Pettit combined. 
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and fourth are realised in ethical consumption and are subservient to the first 
two methods. So although Bakan positions himself as a critic of Freidman, the 
strategy he proposes are actually the methods Freidman endorses in his article. 
Bakan, thereby, re-shapes the spectre of anti-capitalism back into the familiar 
corporeal form of business.  
Bakan initially discusses promotion of ethical consumption. Consumers, as 
private citizens, should make retail decisions based on the corporation’s ethics. 
Business in return, to protect its bottom line will act to meet these ethically 
concerned demands (ibid.: 144-45), hiring socially responsible business 
managers (ibid.: 143-44). Nonetheless, whilst welcoming and promoting 
consumers’ power to economically punish corporate malevolence, Bakan 
recognises that this response on its own is inadequate (ibid.: 145). Ethical 
consumption is an inadequate response for a number of reasons. The first is that 
because of poverty a significant portion of the public has little or no consumer 
power. Secondly, once an enterprise operates as a business, its ‘moral concerns 
and altruistic desires must succumb to [a]… corporations overriding goal’ (ibid.: 
53). Compassion, which is based on self-interest, is only hypothetical and 
collapses back into solipsistic self-regard. Ethical shareholding (ibid.: 147) also 
involves no conflict in duties as they, like a single proprietors who pursues social 
responsibility, are ‘spending their own money’ (Friedman, 2007: 177). 
Shareholders who wish to forego profit to pursue an eleemosynary goal are not 
involved in theft. However, as Friedman’s division of organisations highlights, an 
enterprise committed primarily to charitable goals rather than profit is no longer 
a business. In addition, like Friedman, Bakan recognises that in the absence of 
monopoly position, there is little a corporation can do which is beyond self-
interest without harming their competitive position (Bakan, 2004: 147; 
Friedman, 2007: 177).  
Instead Bakan’s first two main strategies are: 1) improving the regulatory system 
and 2) strengthening political democracy. Bakan’s goal is to promote 
representative-democratic control of corporations, through the constitutional 
process: 
Government regulation, unlike market-based solutions, combines authority, 
capacity and democratic legitimacy to protect citizens from corporate misdeeds. 
Through it, governments can pursue social values – such as democracy, social 
justice, citizens’ health and welfare, environmental integrity, cultural identity – 
that lie beyond the narrow goals of self-interest and wealth maximization that 
dictate the behaviour of corporations and markets. (Bakan, 2004: 149) 
This, too, reiterates rather than challenges Friedman. Friedman might reject 
government regulation in his later work, but in ‘The Social Responsibility…’ he 
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argues that corporations should be subservient to the law, and that this is the 
appropriate place for concerned individuals to pursue social goals. Though even 
in this more social-democratic piece, he highlights the dangers to business, and 
thus to a successful and wealthy society, of government interference (Friedman, 
2007: 174-5). 
Although earlier in his book Bakan (2004: 102-04) details how corporations 
manipulate representative government through lobbying and how corporate self-
interest results in companies transgressing laws if this is the most profitable 
action (ibid.: 80), he nonetheless considers state control as the most suitable 
method for controlling corporations, and without this tactic all other methods are 
redundant. 
The movement against corporate rule would be impossible, even senseless, 
without robust nongovernmental institutions, community activism and political 
dissent, the belief that these can be a substitute for governmental regulation, rather 
than a necessary complement to it, is dangerously mistaken. (ibid.: 151) 
Bakan’s recognition of state inadequacy whilst advocating a state-centred strategy 
could be a simple contradiction; however, a more generous reading is that Bakan, 
though seeing the spectre of anti-capitalist alternatives, prefers to hold to the 
supposed pragmatism of existing institution. Representative democracy is, for 
Bakan, a potentially progressive, enabling force, which can avoid succumbing to 
corporate interests through the intervention of an active citizenry, having learnt 
from the errors of previous eras. As it is the state that produced and protects the 
corporation, for Bakan (2004: 153-5) it is the state that controls them, with the 
citizenry shaping the direction of the state.  
Bakan defends this liberal-democratic strategy in instrumental grounds, as 
corporations are ‘remarkably efficient wealth-creating machines’ (ibid.: 159). A 
future without them, he claims, is impossible to imagine. As Bakan’s tactics 
reinforce the control of existing economic institutions, what is needed is a system 
to keep them in check (ibid.: 159). These include tighter laws on acquisitions and 
mergers, stakeholder representation on boards (including workers’ 
representatives) and executive responsibility to take stakeholders into account. 
Other proposals include greater enforcement of democratic legislation protecting 
public goods, like a healthy, diverse ecological environment and public health 
(ibid.: 160-2). 
To ensure democratic control Bakan looks to his final two main tactics: 3) the 
creation a robust public sphere not answerable to corporate interests or operating 
on business principles which, 4) challenges international neo-liberalism (ibid.: 
163-4). Seeing the spectre of the anti-capitalist movement as a challenge to 
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corporate-rule (ibid.: 22-3, 141, 166), Bakan nonetheless encourages this menace 
back into the familiar institutional forms of the liberal-capitalist order 
(corporations, representative legislature, centralised enforcement) and its 
primary social relationships (consumer-producer, citizen-government). The 
radicalised citizenry’s job is to influence governments, corporations and trans-
national institutes such as the World Trade Organisation (ibid.: 164) not to 
undermine and replace them. Bakan exorcises not the malevolence of the 
corporation, which remains intact, but the spectre of a transcendent alternative: 
the shades of anti-capitalist identities, practices and principles. 
Unsurprisingly, Bakan is by no means unique in critiquing Friedman’s 
encomium for self-interested corporations and the system of neo-liberal global 
governance they have spawned. Crane and Matten (2010: 49), for instance, argue 
that Friedman’s account of corporate agency and responsibility is inaccurate. 
Corporations are more than just amalgamations of individual interests: ‘every 
organization has a corporate internal decision structure that directs corporate 
decisions in line with pre-determined goals’ (ibid.).  Whilst it is possible to track 
back decisions to groups of individuals, it is rarely a single individual alone who 
has responsibility in corporate decision making. Corporations have a structure 
for decision-making based on an established purpose for action that ‘clearly 
transcends the individual’s framework for responsibility’ (ibid.: 49). The 
corporate goals are set beyond the scope of particular individuals and only 
operate because there is collective agreement. Further corporations generate a 
culture that (partially) forms an individual’s identity and a set of criteria by which 
problems are identified and solutions are framed. Whilst formal methods for 
constructing and maintaining a business culture exist (for instance, in the 
manufacture of corporate identities and adoption of formal codes of practice), 
most features of an institutional culture is informally, unconsciously and inter-
subjectively generated.  
In addition, Crane and Matten highlight how there is significant history of CSR 
(ibid.: 56), especially in the absence of socially benevolent government (ibid.: 68-
9). They raise the possibility of ‘corporate citizenship as a framework for 
business ethics’. As corporations are frequently trans-national, they can 
encourage and protect social, political and economic freedoms. This is not just 
that corporations out of CSR should dedicate resources (which could go to 
shareholders) on promoting social, political and economic rights but that they are 
best placed, in a globalising economy, to use their significant resources to 
promote these goals. Again, however, there is the underlying suggestion that 
corporate citizenship benefits the bottom-line for business, through helping 
build up new, responsive and responsible businesses that assist the company’s 
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supply chain, and develop social infrastructure for future expansion (Valente and 
Crane, 2009: 80-81). As such, it reinforces, rather than challenges Friedman’s 
account of corporate self-interest and hidden-hand benefits. 
A different set of criticisms are raised by business virtue-theorist Robert C. 
Solomon. He argues that Friedman misconstrues the moral character of the 
corporation as one based on greed (and by implication Bakan’s critique is 
erroneous too). Although Friedman is not named, Solomon’s (2002: 31-2) 
criticism of avaricious (self-interested alone) behaviour from those who follow 
Smith’s economic analysis (The Wealth of Nations) without his corresponding 
virtue theory (Theory of Moral Sentiments) appears to be aimed at Friedman and 
his Chicago School adherents. Solomon associates Friedman’s account of 
successful corporate practice with the traits of ‘competitiveness, individualism, 
and economic self-interest’ and these are destructive of harmonious, social 
communities. Businesses require other virtues that Friedman overlooks (ibid.: 
33). Solomon (2002: 35), citing Abraham Zeleznick, considers business as a 
repository of virtues such as ingenuity, and considers it a mistake to think of 
them as only motivated by greed. Friedman, by concentrating on only one 
supreme virtue, turns it into a vice as it is not-moderated by the other virtues 
essential to good business practice. 
Anarchist responses 
Having outlined Friedman’s main argument and some of the major criticisms 
from his mainstream business ethics critics, here I develop an anarchist 
response to these, based on the core concepts of a contestation of hierarchical 
social structures, the social, malleable view of the self, commitment to 
prefiguration and a rejection of epistemological universalism. In addition I shall 
respond to some potential replies to these anarchist criticisms.  
Bakan’s book ends with an appendix, an interview with Noam Chomsky that 
promotes a critique which is quite different to the one Bakan offers. There are 
some features of the anarchist critique which is shared by the other critics of 
Friedman: for instance, anarchists share a rejection of a purely deontological 
account of ethics and also view Freedman’s ideal-form of business as promoting 
social vices. The anarchist critique goes deeper; it questions the notion that 
markets are models of consent, instead identifying them as coercive and 
discriminatory. Rather than see the state as a rival institution to constrain the 
corporation, anarchists consider the corporation as intimately interconnected 
with state power, being manufactured and mutually reinforced by the state. 
Furthermore, the reliance on state power assumes an immodest and 
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epistemologically-suspect promotion of a universal or trans-traditional structure 
and governance principles. So in addition, they reject Bakan’s and Crane and 
Matten’s solutions to corporate power and also consider Solomon’s defence of 
corporate virtues to be inadequate. Instead the virtues are best protected and 
enhanced through the methods Bakan eludes to but considers ineffective; the 
promotion of radical, anti-capitalist social practices. 
Anarchism and Friedman 
Friedman’s defence of the supreme protection of the profit-motive is 
deontological. Agents have voluntarily agreed to work for a company, and part of 
their voluntary agreement, is to pursue the interests of the corporation, which is 
profit maximisation. Any external interference in these arrangements is a 
violation of negative freedom. Placing the question aside for one moment of 
whether the voluntary obligations of sovereign subjects is the supreme principle , 
it is not just anarchists, but other theorists too, who consider negative rights an 
inadequate account of freedom, posited on an unjustified and flawed account of a 
fixed, ontologically-isolated individual. 
Freedom is not just about freedom from interference, but also about freedom to 
do and to be. As Emma Goldman (1969: 53-5) points out, without access to 
resources, a pauper has little or no freedom, and little chance to develop into a 
fully-rounded, free individual, even if no one is explicitly interfering. Whilst it is 
usually the inadequacy of the liberal concept of freedom that provokes criticism 
from political philosophers such as Pettit, Quentin Skinner and Charles Taylor, 
anarchists anti-hierarchical principles identify markets relationships, based on 
negative freedom, as themselves coercive. 
Markets are not realms of freedom, despite Friedman’s assertion, because of 
enclosure (privatisation): many of those in economically subservient positions 
have no choice but to sell their labour. There is a choice as to who to sell it to, 
but, under capitalism, there is no reasonable choice, for those in a vulnerable 
position in the economic hierarchy, as to whether they sell their labour. It is for 
this reason that the anarchist anthropologist David Graeber (2004: 70-1) 
resurrects the notion of ‘wage-slavery’ (see also Kropotkin, 2013). Similarly, 
under capitalism, to gain goods people must enter into market relationships. 
Where there are commons or co-operative economies there are alternative 
relationships of production and distribution (see Ward, 1973: 95-109 and 138-42).  
Although there are weaknesses in Susan L. Brown’s (2003) existentialist account 
of anarchism, she rightly identifies that anarchism resists the identification of 
the individual with one particular identity, especially that of Lockean possessive 
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individualism. As anarchism recognises that individuals are, at least in part, 
socially produced (structured by and responding to the social practices they 
inhabit), the individual can and does re-shape their identity according to context: 
at times being a ‘contributor’, ‘lover’, ‘colleague’, ‘comrade’ and many other 
practitioner roles, without ever being reduced to just one. Thus, reducing 
individual agency to Friedman’s simplistic position based a possessive account of 
the individual (and a supposed binary opposition between state and capital), 
obscures and represses the spectral presence of alternative anti-state, anti-
capitalist actors. 
Anarchists also deny that markets are responsive and utilitarian. Friedman’s 
argument is that if a good is deemed valuable (like a healthy environment) then 
people will be willing to buy goods that protect it. Anarchists, however, point out 
that markets have incentives for generating social problems in order to provide 
profitable remedies. Indeed the creation of unnecessary scarcity, by copyrighting 
and controlling manufacture, can maximise profits, rather than increasing 
production, which might lower the price (Chomsky and Achbar, 2004: 195-6; 
Gordon and Griffiths, 2007: 85). In addition, markets are not responsive to need, 
but to demand. A homeless person has a need for a house, but no demand, 
whilst those with high demand, have their desires (even if only a minor interest) 
catered for. The controversial UN happiness index, which surveys the attitudes of 
population, found the happiest countries were those with a high degree of 
socialised access to goods. The usually economically liberal Time magazine, 
quoting the Washington Post, concedes that ‘The U.S. has had a three time 
increase of GNP per capita since 1960, but the happiness needle hasn’t budged. 
Other countries have pursued other policies and achieved much greater gains of 
happiness, even at much lower levels of per capita income’ (van Gilder Cook, 
2012). 
This disconnect between increase in production of external goods leading to no 
greater (and possibly even declines in) happiness, so long as basic needs for 
social living are met is explained by the Anarchist FAQ. Even if market 
arrangements do increase production of external goods, capitalist social relations 
undermine the types of truly valuable relationship.  
In other words, while a society may become materially better off over time, it 
becomes worse off in terms of real wealth, which is those things which make life 
worth living. Thus capitalism has a corrosive effect on human relationships, the 
pleasure of productive activity (work), genuine freedom for the many, how we treat 
each other and so on. The corrosive effects of economics are not limited simply to 
the workplace but seep into all other aspects of your life. (Anarchist FAQ, 2013) 
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Turning all complex social practices and relationships into ones governed 
primarily by the narrow norms of deontology and the corresponding limited set 
of ethical-political identities, undermines goods-rich behaviour. Such 
instrumentality undermines the generation of prefigurative goods, and places 
everything under the hierarchical control of the bourgeois class (Marx and 
Engels, 1977: 38).  
Thus, Friedman’s defence, like that of Robert Nozick (1974: 250-3 and 326-7), 
that free markets allow for different models of production, including those based 
on anarchist models of co-operation, is inadequate. Friedman and Nozick argue 
that if consumers are willing to pay the excess to support co-operatively produced 
goods (a description that can be accommodated under CSR), then as long as 
there is a market to secure it, then the business will succeed. Thus, one can have 
workers’ self-management so long as there is consumer demand. If there is no 
market then: ‘His customers and employees can desert him for other producers 
and employers less scrupulous in exercising their social responsibilities’ 
(Friedman, 2007: 176).  
It is to this that Jason Brennan’s ‘anarchism’ also appeals. He is one of the few 
business ethicists to engage with anarchism and recognise its difference from 
Nozickian propertarianism (Brennan, 2013: 273); he nevertheless considers 
anarchism to be compatible with market relationships. Brennan suggests that 
reciprocal production through voluntary mutual aid is acceptable, so long as the 
interaction between the different anti-hierarchical practices abide by the rules of 
the market (ibid.: 278-80). So, for instance, the acquisition of material for the 
maintenance of anarchist social practices has to abide by neo-Kantian market 
principles. 
There are a number of problems for consistent anarchists with Brennan, Nozick 
and Friedman’s argument that markets allow for productive and distributive 
practices that are internally governed by anti-capitalist principle. The first, as 
Pierre-Joseph Proudhon and his commentators such as Iain McKay (2011) point 
out (and later picked up by Samuel Bowles and Herbert Gintis [1986: 68-71]) 
labour is not as free to build production based on egalitarian social forms as 
capitalists are on hierarchical ones. This is because the labouring class lacks 
access to financial resources under as favourable and competitive manner as 
existing capitalists and those based primarily on exploiting labour to the 
maximum. It is for this reason that Proudhon attempted to develop a People’s 
bank to assist in cooperative production – and its subsequent failure due to its 
inadequate assets rather than lack of members (McKay, 2011, 57; see also Dana, 
1896). 
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 The second is that even when there are diverse, anti-hierarchical practice 
intersect they must, according to liberals like Friedman, Nozick and Brennan 
accede, at least initially, to neo-Kantian principles. These market principles are 
universally prior and apply across all intersecting networks of social activities. All 
social practices must initially at least agree that the principles of market 
distribution and exchange are universally prior. 
Anarchists and free-market liberals like Hayek agree that knowledge is always 
partial and incomplete and that no single central mind can investigate, gather 
and assimilate all relevant information. However, Hayek (1945: 526) argues that 
a single mechanism, that of the pricing system provides the most effective and 
efficient means for co-ordinating supply and demand of goods. Yet such a system 
itself relies on universal principles to govern the interchange of all social action, 
those of universal property rights. If, as Hayek contends, universal knowledge is 
not possible, how is it possible to deduce the universal principles that underpin 
market mechanisms? The extension of claims of authority beyond that supported 
by legitimate knowledge leads, as Bakunin notes, to ‘slavery and absurdity’.  
The assumption that capitalist principles are universal is an assertion that recurs 
in both Friedman and his business ethics competitors. It is an ‘incantation [that] 
repeats and ritualizes itself, it holds forth and holds to formulas, like any 
animistic magic’ (Derrida, 2006: 64). It is part of the ceremony of capitalism to 
reassure itself in the presence of the spectre of anti-market alternatives. 
Anarchism and Friedman’s critics 
Bakan’s text is critical of the anti-state solutions, though they remain as shades, 
inadequately enunciated. Chomsky’s appended interview, seemingly included to 
support Bakan’s main position on the dangers of corporations, includes a clear 
critique of Bakan’s solution. Despite Bakan’s hostile portrayal of the corporation 
as a psychopathic entity which produces significant social ills and malignly alters 
human character to fit with its self-serving goals, he argues that corporations are 
too important to resist. His solution shares many of the key features of 
Friedman’s approach in regarding the proper function of the state and indeed of 
the possibility of enlightened self-interest. 
Bakan (2004: 151) contrasts his pragmatic response with the utopianism of his 
left opponents, not named as anarchists but clearly consistent with anarchism as 
they have abandoned government and a belief in progressive legislation in favour 
of direct protest. Bakan argues that the anti-statism of the anti-globalisation 
protestors assists corporations as the state is the only thing that can control them 
(ibid.: 151). Bakan develops a dichotomy between corporations with or without 
Benjamin Franks Anarchism and business ethics 
article | 719 
state control, the former being benevolent and democratic, the latter malevolent 
and unresponsive.  
The first criticism anarchists make is that Bakan’s division is a false dichotomy: 
there are alternatives to corporate power for the production and distribution of 
goods. Much anarchist literature, from Kropotkin (2013: 1939) to more recent 
radicals (see, for instance, Ward, 1973; Gilroy-Scott, 2007; Gordon and Griffiths, 
2007; Shantz, 2010) outlines how goods can – and are – generated without the 
primacy of managerial hierarchy or the law of value. Second, to quote John 
Holloway (2002: 12), the ‘record in practice’ of Bakan’s social democratic model 
‘has differed very little from overtly pro-capitalist governments’: to continue to 
hold on to the progressive possibility of a statist solution is more utopian than 
the supposed ‘impossiblist’ remedy he rejects.  
Chomsky explains why corporations cannot be altered through appeals to 
enlightened self-interest or the influence of state. Even if corporations do act to 
meet social needs, out of enlightened self-interest, this is not a morally desirable 
outcome as the populace is still dependent on benevolent tyrants (Chomsky and 
Achbar, 2004: 181). In addition, shifting the legal position of corporations is 
unlikely to resolve matters as the institutions of law are themselves oppressive. 
Finally, as Bakan himself notes copiously throughout the rest of the book, 
corporations seek to alter law and influence or overthrow unsympathetic 
governments.  
Bakan’s project requires that the public are organised and dynamic; that they are 
engaged in activities that are rich in critical virtues (bravery, wisdom, 
compassion, and justice), such that plural bodies of civil society can investigate 
and publicise corporate excess and pressure them to alter their products, and to 
ensure that the state behaves responsively and progressively. Yet, if such strong, 
inter-linked but non-statist practices exist there is no need for the state or 
production based on business principles. 
Corporations cannot be the origin of virtuous action as if they act in virtuous 
ways before there is sufficient consumer interest, then they will be replaced, as 
Friedman rightly argues, by those competitors who do not waste resources 
(Friedman, 2007). Further, as raised above, with the example of rural service 
enterprises, businesses – institutions that have the profit-motive as its nomos 
(guiding rule) – undermine the generation of external goods. This is not to rule 
out the possibility of virtuous, anti-hierarchical practices generating external 
goods (like a surplus), but these external benefits are not the sole motivating 
intention (although they could be foreseeable consequences).  
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Anarchism’s critique also rejects Crane and Matten’s account of corporate 
citizenship being an enabler for socially progressive, democratic government. 
First, anarchists, like Chomsky, point to the anti-democratic tendencies within 
corporate practice. Corporations are more likely to undermine democratic 
process, restricting information harmful to their corporate interests for instance, 
than support them. Where it does support them, because of popular pressure or 
other facts influencing material self-interest, it is hypothetical and 
epiphenomenal. If self-interest means undermining civil virtues, as it so often 
does in economically competitive situations, then the corporation must act 
unvirtuously or cease to be a business. Thus, the anarchist replies, business 
should be destroyed to allow virtuous relationships to flourish. 
Second, where a citizenry is actively engaged in contesting and evading 
corporate-state practices, then to encourage them to re-engage with psychopathic 
enterprise will only diminish the generation of virtuous counter-power. The 
social hierarchies of state and corporate power undermine virtuous activity, 
rather than sustain it. Virtues are best realised in anti-hierarchical social 
relations. Wisdom, for instance, is the shared generation and distribution of 
knowledge, to lessen hierarchies of expertise. Hoarding of specialist knowledge 
under license is promoting the vice of ignorance.  
Solomon’s account of corporate virtues is inconsistent with virtue theory. There 
is no denying that some businesspersons might be trustworthy and honest 
(Solomon, 2002: 33) or prudent (Machan, 2002: 93), however, for an activity to 
be truly virtuous there has to be consistency between the virtues. A salesman, for 
instance, is under no obligation to point out the commodities faults, only not to 
lie, if asked. Solomon identifies desirable social characteristics (not all of them 
moral ones) such as innovation, generosity and toughness. Yet when these occur 
within the context of a business exchange, they are no longer goods because they 
are not mediated by other important virtues (such as benevolence, sociability and 
honesty). The businessperson’s innovation is used to maximise material 
advantage and thus for domination, rather than for developing benevolent social 
relations.  
Finally, the growth of corporate activism and a corresponding corporocentric 
ethic, as Stephen Harper (2012: 15-16) rightly points out, has not been an 
adequate response to the crises of governability. Neo-liberalism has been wrongly 
associated with the decline of state-power, and thus of greater individual freedom 
and responsibility. However, governments have not become less powerful as 
myth suggests, but merely more active in their support of corporate interests. 
Under state guidance institutions are transformed into corporations, generating 
not more virtuous institutional behaviour but more vice-like ones. Burkard 
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Sievers (2008) identifies in his analysis of Friedman-like psychopathic 
institutional development within academia, that universities have increasingly 
prioritised the external goods of profit over the internal goods of the academic 
disciplines they were originally set up to protect and enhance, undermining 
educational virtues in the process.  
Conclusion 
Friedman’s essay and the range of criticisms against it have influenced 
organisational behaviours. By clarifying key terms such as ‘business’, 
‘management’ and ‘anarchism’, Friedman’s corporocentric ethics is identified 
alongside some of the critiques it generated from Bakan, Solomon and Crane 
and Matten. These counter-analyses rather than encouraging deeper reflection on 
the limitations of business norms (in the orthodox sense) return repeatedly to the 
very principles and institutions they correctly identify as inadequate. In its place 
anarchism’s critique is applied against Friedman and standard approaches to 
business ethics.  
Anarchist responses point to the thinness of Friedman’s ethical principles and 
the inadequacy of the epistemological grounds that maintain them, such as the 
unjustified claims to universality. Anarchism draws out the contradiction in 
Friedman’s account of freedom and the damaging social institutions and 
identities it produces. Anarchism also provides, albeit in still shadowy and 
incomplete forms, alternative productive and distributive practices where both 
internal goods (virtues) and external goods (surplus) can, and are, generated on 
anti-hierarchical, prefigurative principles. Such an approach can thus assist those 
critically-engaged in re-thinking practices and relations of production. 
The ‘unholy alliance’ of the economic-liberal Friedman and his apparent statist 
and progressive critics are haunted by the transcendent possibilities of alternative 
social practices based on anti-commercial, anti-hierarchical norms. Alternatives, 
such as anarchism, are suppressed or re-shaped in attempts to control and negate 
them, but they still continue to haunt capitalism – and may still take a more 
corporeal, anti-corporate form. 
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